

SPIDER DIPLOMACY AS A SCHEME OF UNDERSTANDING THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STATE DIPLOMACY

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Abstract

From many strategic concepts for international diplomacy that have been used, they are usually used as "patience strategy" (Barack Obama), "strategic responsibility" (Donald Trump), "preventive warfare" (George W. Bush), "Chaos strategy" (Valery Gerasimov), etc. However, these concepts were more political than scientific, and for our scientific needs we need a schematic diagram that shows the basis, scope and purpose of diplomacy, a method for explaining actions that would provide with a correlation method. That scheme we will call "spider diplomacy". Through this concept we will try to explain the diplomatic fury whether defensive or offensive that a state undertakes in certain cases. Such cases can be found quite differently from different states on the eve of the beginning or end of the First and Second World War. However, on issues of the most accurate study, leaving space for other studies to clarify this concept, we will focus on the case of Serbia's diplomacy on the Kosovo issue, which includes the time when it comes to "internal dialogue" in Serbia on the issue of Kosovo, and as a second instance, clashes between the world powers of countries such as the United States, Russia and China in the diplomatic and geostrategic aspects. The first case will be to enable us to explain the concept, while large power cases are about the definition of the concept and the approaches it takes at certain moments. So this paper contains the definition, purpose and use of "spider diplomacy" by the state for certain purposes.

Key words: spider diplomacy, realism, offensive, defensive.

Introduction

International relations have become a polarizing, multi-stratified and conceptual dynamic after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Many diplomatic doors were opened with various goals and attitudes that today make it impossible to fully follow international relations and, even less likely to be covered by a theoretical coverage by international policy and international scholars. Therefore, theories of international relations have joined many new concepts such as; offensive realism, defensive, structuralist, etc., although they were before the 90s of the last century, yet they found dynamism after the 90s. However, it has been inevitable for international research scholars and the study of strategies emerging from the leaders of the powerful nations of the world, where we are just mentioning some that are entirely new, such as that of George W. Bush, the preventive war, of Barack Obama, the strategy of patience, then the last by Donald Trump, strategic responsibility, the chaos strategy by Russian general Valery Gerasimov, and others.

But these completely realistic strategies have in themselves contained a network of multi-level actions, with many reasons and actions but with just one purpose. And consequently, this networking, though covered by realistic theory with its concepts, has failed to explain the movement and the reason for the layout schematic that does not allow us as researchers to lose any element during our studies of state actions.

So to cover our actions we have chosen to use a scheme called "spider diplomacy", which we will elaborate later to justify the concept as well. But this concept will have a treatment within the approach and principles of realistic theory, but to make this concept more accessible to us, we will dwell on the study of "spider diplomacy" from Serbia versus Kosovo and will be illustrated with examples.

Spider's diplomacy under the optics of realistic theory

While old realists assume that war alone is a condition for changing international relations, young realists reject this assumption. Even to go even further, after the September 11th incident there was a debate about the validity of international relations theories. (Bunyavejchewin, Theories of International Politics after the Incident of 9/11: The Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twentieth-First Century, 2012). Such a thing, but differently for the end of the wars, was also attempted to formulate Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s, but it turned out that international relations only experienced dynamics change but no end of wars.

Thucydides' classic realism says that "The strong do what they have the power to do, while the weak receive what they have to accept," but the classmates nevertheless have no realization of Morgenthau's realism, which realism nevertheless sets standards, principles and obligations. (Conces, 2009)

But if realism should have the norms, principles and obligations, who assures us that they will be respected, as Morgenthau himself has deeply studied the school that believes the world is imperfectly rationally pointless, is an inseparable result of the forces of human nature. (Morgenthau, 1948)

But putting the norms, principles and obligations into realistic theory was only a stage of detailing and justifying the realization of the law of the fittest in international anarchy, and all this then by international relations scholars has co-doubled in terms like realism offensive and defensive.

So today we are faced with a struggle of moralistic realism with norms, principles and obligations.

Not to let go of what is the offensive and defensive realization, since it is not in their own interest to explain them, but only the necessary use for "spider diplomacy", we will stop this last concept of understanding why it was born this concept.

The stage of our research is practically the development of Russian and Serbian diplomacy towards the new state of Kosovo.

The theory development in the context of the "spider diplomacy" analysis

The beginning of political science and later of international relations as science and practice has had a small confrontation from the division with the economic sphere. If all states intervene to regulate and limit problems with economic markets, and markets create effects that affect states' behavior (Rosenberg, 1994) then why was the discipline of international relations, or political sciences in

general needed. In order not to waste space in answering this question, Rosenberg simply opens the door to "for deeper answers we need to go out of the existing discipline ...". (Rosenberg, 1994)

The creation of study disciplines has covered many gaps in understanding the practices and actions of states. How could we understand the missile crisis in Cuba if international relations were not a discipline in itself?

Every discipline and subfield of politics has its rise and a process that is not infrequently long and very contradictory when we talked about Bush's new strategies, Obama, Gerasimov, etc., we talked about new strategies that are practical and are covered by the international relations field and the foreign policy analysis.

So, if we base ourselves on what the actor's theory in international relations, (Hudson, 2005) and in the induction method, two different sides of the coin are called, but with the sub-field of international relations, the foreign policy analysis, find a practical method of cooperation.

This is because, as Lane explains, the foreign policy analysis is positioned to provide a concrete theory that can revive the link between the theory of the general actor in international relations and the founding of social science. (Lane, 1990).

Here we come to the levels of analysis where three of them directly influence international relations. While in the analysis of "spider diplomacy" we have to be within interstate level in cooperation with influences such as power (war and diplomacy), balance of powers (treaties and summits), alliance formation (trade agreements and deals) and dissolution of alliances (IGOs and reciprocity). (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2014)

How "spider diplomacy" came

In order not to dwell in the explanatory context of the already well-known progress of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, we will only explain the events, statements and actions that interpose and justify "spider diplomacy".

However, we must remember a statement by the Ukrainian ambassador to Serbia for Russia before we put all the blame on Serbia.



Figure 1. Spider Diplomacy from Russia

Ukraine's ambassador to Serbia, Oleksand Aleksandrovych, stated: "Russia is training Serbian mercenaries to kill in Ukraine. Russia is using Serbian extremists to make a coup in Montenegro. Russia Encourages Serbian separatism (Bosnian Serb-dominated entity) in Republika Srpska to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia is using the Serbian factor to destabilize Macedonia. Russia is playing an active role in countering Kosovo Serbs against Albanians in Kosovo. Russia is selling arms to Serbia to create tensions with Croatia. (Zivanovic, 2017) If we look at 'Figure 1', then we draw a concept of three levels of "spider diplomacy":

So, "spider diplomacy" includes three sub-concepts:

1. Spider diplomacy based from state actors to non-state actors;
2. Spider diplomacy based from state actors to other state actors; and
3. Mixed spider diplomacy.

In the case of Russia based on Figure 1, we have the case of a six-factor diplomacy, five of which belong to the mixed sub-concept, and only a sub-concept state actor with state actors.



Figure 2. Serbia's Spider Diplomacy

Another chronological illustration can be the statements and actions of politicians in governance in Serbia over Kosovo.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, before the informal meeting with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, said that dialogue should be on the fate of Serbs not in the north of Mitrovica but within Kosovo and 'Metohija' because they are vulnerable and discriminated (B92, 2017).

Ana Brnabic, Serbia's prime minister, then stated that a dialogue on autonomy for northern Kosovo needs to be discussed and then talks on the final status of Kosovo, and if Serbia is obliged to choose between the EU and Russia, it will choose the EU -in. (Savic & Filipovic, 2017)

Brnabic, again said that Serbia would be EU partner and friend of Russia. (B92, 2017)

Jadranka Joksimovic, Serbia's European Integration Minister, said Serbia would receive over 1 billion Euros of EU aid for the membership process by 2020. (MEI, 2017)

Milovan Drečun, head of the parliamentary commission in the Serbian Assembly for Kosovo and "Metohija", stated that the Special War Crimes Tribunal committed by former senior officers of the "Kosovo Liberation Army" is the international community's latest attempt to judge crimes against Serbs and non-Albanians, and Serbia will help this process.

Ivica Dacic, stated that Serbia would never break relations with its permanent allies that are Russia and China under any condition. (RS: MFA, 2017)

Brnabic: Russia is an important partner of Serbia and we want to deepen cooperation in the development sector, research and university cooperation. (B92, 2017)

These two actions of Russia and Serbia are the first basic tests that become "spider diplomacy".

Spider's diplomacy as Russia's offensive and defensive of the West by the EU

Realist defensive diplomacy remains an unbeatable point, which was the best of all times Bismarck in its use, however, it should be remembered that the realist defensive foreign policy is not to behave as an aggressor, especially when it comes to what is called "preventive war".

With offensive and defensive realism, realism is no longer just a theory of war but also diplomacy and struggle as a last resort, or, on the other, strong diplomacy. Van Evra gives ten of his explanations to war, including diplomacy in his hypotheses, and gives particular attention to diplomacy 'fait accompli', which builds everything in the way it sends off the offensive. (Van Evra, 1998).

But the structuralist realism in defensive realism argues that the mass of power that states can be constrained by structural factors, while on the other hand, the offensive, they think it is the state structure that encourages states to increase their share of power world. (Mearsheimer, 2013)

There is an unwritten rule that the fall and rise of nations passes into phases which dictate internal circumstances for sociological and psychological reasons. There is also a debate on rotten democracies, the rotten system, but we cannot afford space here, though they are irrelevant.

But to summarize, to justify the title of this part, Russia is using the realist structuralist offensive, extending many levels, and utilizing alliances for its diplomacy as Van Evras explained. But why is Russia in the offensive and the EU defensively? A few years ago, when NATO gained ground with

new membership, it seemed that Russia did not have anything against it, but when the terrain began to narrow, it came back first with Georgia to come to date with Crimea and a little bit with Montenegro. Now, Russia considers and responds to every benefit of NATO and the West, counting as a loss to Russia. And if the answer is not reciprocal, then it is even more fatal, i.e. reprieve or retorsion, or as they say, "For every Moldova there is a Montenegro. For every Ukraine there is a Serbia". (Bechev, 2017) We can continue with ourselves, that "for every Bosnia there is a Republika Srpska, for every Kosovo there is a North Mitrovica", or worse: "Every Kosovo has an Estonian" ... And today we are in the middle confrontation between the EU and Russia, where confronting both of them keeps the Western Balkan countries under the balance of the realist defense-offensive.

The EU with its internal problems and fears of new Crimea's, under pressure from the withdrawal of Great Britain, and the pressure of new potential domestic disintegration such as that in Catalonia, admits that in the external sphere the status quo, just as the defensive states trying to do, explaining Van Evra.

The EU faces domestic problems, with a US that is attracting more attention from the Middle East and Asia, especially now after the US and NATO close the door to the Adriatic for Russia with Montenegro's membership in NATO, Russia requires space to act to save what is left to escape. This can be done by expanding its influence in many spheres, such as religion, cultural ties, media propaganda, political support, military support, ideological influence as in the Cold War, etc., which exposes a spider that emits a net and requires space action where there is no institutionalization that explains Daron Acemogly and James A. Robinson in the book *Why Nations Fail*.

The European Union, in spite of Russian and Serbian 'spider diplomacy' in the Balkans

Western Balkan countries are still under autocratic safeguards, with serious flaws of democracy, and with autocratic leaders who are beyond legal radar.

Recently, without any diplomatic language, US Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoyt Yee also criticized. The latter stressed that Western governments should be more cumbersome towards corrupt leaders and involved in organized crime in the Western Balkans. He further added that it is shameful how those formal leaders are expected in European capitals as if there is no harm to them. (ABC, 2017)

But why does the EU allow this? Having difficult and hot topics for the region, topics that are not popular and democratic at all, a BIEPAG report considers that the EU preferred a leadership-driven approach to its engagement in the region. (BIEPAG, 2017) The result of all these EU preferences has been the growth of a regional "stabilitocracy", weak democrats with autocratic leaders who rule through informal network patronage and claim to secure pro-Western stability in the region. (BIEPAG, 2017)

The Russian threat rejects external pressure on political and institutional change, (Bechev, 2017) from EU pressure on the Western Balkans. Therefore, for the autocratic elites of the Balkans as pro-Western as possible, the impact of different clientele, money, crime and xenophobia in the Western Balkans allows Russia's action space, which is aimed at overthrowing the West-led order. And this also pushed Prof. Dr. Blerim Reka to come up with the idea of establishing an International Anti-Corruption Tribunal for the Western Balkans, urging the EU to leave diplomacy. (Reka, 2017) This gave the offensive scope of Russia's spider diplomacy, which also strengthened its ally Serbia in the Balkans, creating a defensive rush for the EU. This network is pushing the US to return specifically to the chess table in the Balkans, which first warned it with direct participation in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

Conclusions

From the theoretical and practical paradigm discussed above, spider diplomacy is a concept of foreign policy analysis based on the theory of structuralist realism that the context finds in pragmatism. So pragmatism is the key part of this concept. Spider diplomacy is not just a concept that explains state movements and tactics in foreign policy, but is based on analysis and is included in long-term strategies that have a clear purpose and aim at achieving it through multi-level offensive and defensive battles.



Figure 3. Spider diplomacy and constituent parts

Spider's diplomacy is not a competitor of the offensive and defensive realism in the theoretical plane, but it is only a component of both as a practical plan scheme.

Spider diplomacy is the middle of explaining why a country or alliance is offensive and the other in defense.

“Spider Diplomacy” may not stand the time and inappropriate in many stages of the study, but this is not a disadvantage for this concept, as in a very polar, dynamic and interdisciplinary science, theories are not manage to be able to explain the circumstances and their prediction.

In the spider diplomacy from the elaboration of two examples, we saw that its effect at first glance is just a ranking, but if we recall the ten reasons that send to the war of Van Evras, one of those reasons was about the strategies and secret actions of states with also secret purposes, spider diplomacy helps us build a scheme that similarly to chess gives us the chance to understand the whereabouts of a state actor who has taken such an initiative.

Thus, spider diplomacy lies in the observation, elaboration and discovery of the goals and actions of states or alliances that aim to dominate the region, the continent, and have hegemony.

Scientific works of such nature are in small numbers because the concept of spider diplomacy is a methodology that did not exist before, so it is difficult to explain and to find its advantages and disadvantages. However, it is only a starting point for welcoming more criticisms and studies, and this work in the future will be the source and incentive for such research.

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