THE EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO (EULEX): BETWEEN NORMATIVE AMBITIONS AND STRUCTURAL ASYMMETRIES IN POST-CONFLICT STATEBUILDING

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Abstract

Launched in 2008 under the institutional architecture of the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) constitutes a primary operational instrument of the European Union's comprehensive strategy to foster post-conflict normalization, institutional development, and rule-of-law adherence (Zupančič et al., 2018). Tasked with mitigating the complex legacies of the Yugoslav and Kosovo conflicts—specifically through the arduous prosecution of inter-ethnic war crimes, the humanitarian identification of missing persons, and the stabilization of multi-ethnic administrative structures—EULEX was strategically conceived as a normative mechanism designed to project European standards of justice, human rights, and good governance into an unstable region (Spernbauer, 2019; Özkanca, 2017). However, a rigorous evaluation spanning over sixteen years of continuous implementation reveals persistent structural shortfalls in rule-of-law outcomes, which have frequently exacerbated social fragmentation between the majority Kosovo Albanian and minority Kosovo Serb communities (Radin, 2013; Cierco & Reis, 2014). Utilizing the sophisticated theoretical framework of EU normative power, this academic analysis examines the institutional limitations, mandate transitions, and operational efficacy of EULEX across its various evolutionary phases (Manners, 2002; Tocci, 2007). The empirical and analytical findings demonstrate a fundamental misalignment between the top-down, standardized normative frameworks propagated by Brussels and the intricate, polarized socio-political realities on the ground, thereby exposing a profound structural asymmetry between the Union's ambitious strategic objectives and its actual local implementation capacities (Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012; Visoka, 2016).

Key words: EULEX, Kosovo, E, rule of Law

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was established in 2008 as a major civilian crisis management mission intended to support the development, consolidation, and independent functioning of rule-of-law institutions throughout Kosovo (Council of the European Union, 2008; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2019). From its very inception, EULEX operated within an exceptionally polarized political and social landscape, characterized by deeply competing international and local positions regarding the final political status of Kosovo and the exact parameters of the mission's jurisdictional mandate (Weller, 2009; Krasniqi, 2014). The post-conflict societal milieu featured a stark demographic divide between an estimated 2.1 million Kosovo Albanians and approximately 100,000 Kosovo Serbs (Zupančič et al., 2018). The Serb population was geographically bifurcated, with roughly half concentrated in the northern municipalities immediately bordering the Republic of Serbia, while the remaining population resided in scattered, vulnerable enclaves dispersed across the broader territory (Özkanca, 2017). The commencement of EULEX's operations was further complicated by political confusion surrounding its status-neutral posture, an immense backlog of unresolved judicial cases inherited from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and a distinct lack of clear jurisdictional boundaries between Kosovo institutions, Serbian illegal or parallel structures, and international bodies, particularly in northern Kosovo before the formal adoption of the Brussels Agreements (Příhoda, 2020; Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015). Normatively, EULEX was formally defined as providing critical support in the broad domain of the rule of law, while functionally encompassing a wide spectrum of internal security issues through an integrated police, judicial, and customs architecture (Spernbauer, 2019). Consequently, the mission was presented in official public discourse as a cornerstone of the multi-layered process aimed at the social normalization of relations between

Belgrade and Prishtina under the direct auspices of the European Union (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015). This policy framework sought to engage both high-level intergovernmental actors and grassroots local communities (EPLO, 2015). With this ambitious institutional setup, the mission maintained the explicit aspiration not only to temporarily fill functional vacuums in local justice administration but also to act as a vital mechanism for building public trust in the legal system, aligning with the EU's self-perception as a consistent normative actor in a shifting international environment (Manners, 2002; Tocci, 2007). The EU's normative identity in this context is theoretically grounded in the establishment of novel standards in international politics founded upon cosmopolitan norms of universal human rights, the rule of law, sustainable peace, and long-term development (Tocci, 2007; Manners, 2002). Concurrently, within its broader crisis management and foreign policy paradigm, the European Union presents the deployment of civilian missions as an integral tactical component of a wider strategy aimed at achieving overarching geopolitical and security objectives (Grevi et al., 2009; Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014). This paper critically investigates the scope, constraints, and systemic paradoxes of the EULEX mission, analyzing it as a tangible instrument of the EU's normative action within a deeply divided post-conflict society (Zupančič et al., 2018; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2019).

Legal Framework, Mandate Evolution, and Institutional Architecture

EULEX was launched as the substantive civilian successor to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), operating initially under the European Security and Defense Policy, which was subsequently renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Spernbauer, 2019; Grevi et al., 2009). The comprehensive legal framework governing the establishment and ongoing functioning of EULEX is anchored in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 (UNSC S/RES/1244)—the foundational international legal instrument regulating the presence of the international community in Kosovo—supplemented by the Council of the European Union's Joint Action of February 4, 2008 (2008/124/CFSP), and a continuous series of subsequent Council decisions (United Nations Security Council, 1999; Council of the European Union, 2008). The most recent legislative mandate extension, Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095, governs the mission's current authority within the contemporary security and political context, extending operations through June 14, 2025, with an allocated financial budget of approximately 58.5 million euros (Council of the European Union, 2023).

In accordance with Article 2.1 of the 2008 founding Joint Action, EULEX was mandated to assist Kosovo executive and judicial institutions in their progression toward a sustainable, accountable environment, and to foster the further development of a multi-ethnic judicial system, police service, and customs administration free from political interference and anchored in recognized international standards (Council of the European Union, 2008; Spernbauer, 2019).

The operational modalities of the mission have undergone a profound structural transformation across its timeline (Zupančič et al., 2018):

- **The Executive Phase (2008–2018):** During its initial years, the mission exercised extensive executive powers across its police and justice components, allowing international judges, prosecutors, and police officers to directly conduct investigations, issue indictments, and render binding court judgments in cases of high social and political sensitivity, such as war crimes, organized crime, and high-level corruption (Radin, 2013; Cierco & Reis, 2014).
- **The Advisory, Mentoring, and Supervisory Phase (2018–Present):** Accompanied by the fifth extension of the mission's mandate by the EU Council in 2018, EULEX

underwent a major strategic shift (Özkanca, 2017). Direct executive functions were formally phased out and redirected toward a role centered on monitoring, mentoring, and advising domestic institutions—including support provided to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office based in The Hague (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2019).

This institutional evolution was officially interpreted as part of a broader trajectory toward the Europeanization of Kosovo, aimed at strengthening the institutional accountability and self-reliance of provisional self-government institutions in Prishtina rather than maintaining permanent external trusteeship (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017). Consequently, EULEX became one of the longest-running, most financially resource-intensive, and largest civilian missions in the history of the European Union (Spernbauer, 2019; Grevi et al., 2009). Despite these structural adjustments, the mission's early cooperation with local civil society remained constrained, informal, and largely unidirectional (EPLO, 2015). Evaluations by independent bodies such as the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office noted that numerous civil society organizations actively criticized EULEX's sweeping executive authorities and its status-neutral posture, identifying an acute tension between lofty expectations for effective legal reform and the acute local sensitivity toward sovereignty violations (EPLO, 2015; Příhoda, 2020). Although formal interactions with the civilian sector gradually expanded in later phases, public perception of the mission remained distinctly ambivalent, characterized by deep polarization between the perspectives of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs (KCSS, 2013–2018; Özkanca, 2017). Particularly in northern Kosovo, the mission's legitimacy was consistently contested by the local Serb population—backed by official authorities in Belgrade—which severely restricted the mission's operational efficacy and undermined the broader strategic capacities of the EU in the region (Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012; Zupančič et al., 2018).

Institutional Building, Transitional Justice, and Operational Impediments

Judicial Training and Capacity Building

In alignment with the European Union's strategic vision, academic and institutional evaluations of EULEX have closely examined its concrete impact on strengthening judicial and police infrastructure, combating systemic corruption and organized crime, and advancing sector-wide reforms (European Court of Auditors, 2012; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2019). Official EU progress reports indicate that the mission achieved measurable administrative successes through the professional training and capacity building of local judicial personnel (European Commission, 2023–2024). Specifically, more than 1,000 judges and prosecutors underwent specialized professional development programs sponsored or facilitated by EULEX (Zupančič et al., 2018). Furthermore, notable procedural enhancements were achieved within the Kosovo Police, including the structural integration of ethnic Serb police officers into its operational ranks, which was initially hailed as a vital milestone toward constructing inclusive security architectures and fostering inter-ethnic cooperation (KCSS, 2013–2018; Özkanca, 2017).

Within the critical domain of transitional justice, EULEX collaborated closely with the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Prishtina to excavate, identify, and return the remains of missing persons, a process intended to facilitate societal reconciliation and bolster public trust in institutional mechanisms (Zupančič et al., 2018; Subotić, 2013). The mission also significantly enhanced cross-border and international law enforcement cooperation, facilitating direct information exchange between the Kosovo Police, international organizations such as Interpol and Europol, and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (Spernbauer, 2019). Quantitative metrics from these active operational years demonstrate extensive judicial output:

by 2016, the Special Prosecutor's Office operating under EULEX auspices had participated in the processing of approximately 1,350 distinct cases, while mission-appointed judges had delivered over 600 substantive verdicts by 2018 (Zupančič et al., 2018). Concurrently, approximately 800 accumulated criminal cases were successfully transferred to domestic judicial authorities, and over 40,000 complex property claims were formally resolved through specialized property mechanisms (Zupančič et al., 2018).

Persistent Systemic Deficiencies and Judicial Dysfunction

Conversely, a critical analysis of successive EULEX Justice Monitoring Reports reveals that a staggering number of high-profile cases suffered from profound procedural stagnation across both investigative and judicial phases (EULEX Kosovo, 2022–2024; GLPS, 2014). These proceedings were frequently plagued by endless procedural loops, repetitive retrials, and extensive administrative delays, constituting a severe systemic limitation on the establishment of an efficient judiciary (GLPS, 2014; Boijmans, 2014). Data presented by the head of EULEX's Case Monitoring Unit, Hubert van Eck Koster, in May 2024 underscored these ongoing dysfunctions: between September 2022 and May 2024, out of a total of 821 rigorously monitored court hearings, as many as 230 were formally classified as entirely unproductive, signaling deep structural weaknesses and institutional incapacity in judicial decision-making (EULEX Kosovo, 2022–2024). Koster explicitly highlighted that numerous hearings proceeded without substantive legal advancement, generating unnecessary delays that eroded public confidence in the judicial system's ability to adjudicate complex matters (EULEX Kosovo, 2022–2024).

War crimes trials represent a particularly acute area of concern within this institutional landscape, as they continue to confront severe operational and evidentiary hurdles (Subotić, 2013). With the vast majority of these cases exceeding fifteen years in age, investigative and judicial proceedings are exceptionally arduous (Zupančič et al., 2018). The scarcity of preserved material and forensic evidence forces court proceedings to rely heavily on subjective witness testimonies, introducing critical vulnerabilities regarding evidentiary reliability, witness intimidation, and long-term protection (Subotić, 2013; Boijmans, 2014). These empirical findings unequivocally indicate that Kosovo continues to struggle with fundamental deficits in its institutional capacity to independently investigate and prosecute complex criminality (Radin, 2013; Visoka, 2016).

Corruption, State Capture, and Political Interference

EULEX's exceptionally modest achievements in combating high-level corruption and organized crime—core pillars of its official mandate—have consistently been attributed in official EU discourse to the intrinsic weakness of local institutions and pervasive political constraints (European Court of Auditors, 2012; European Commission, 2023–2024). Although the mission was originally entrusted with establishing criminal accountability for endemic corruption and political interference, annual European Commission progress reports confirm that corruption remains widespread and constitutes a matter of grave long-term concern (European Commission, 2023–2024). The broader project of democratic consolidation, while heavily backed by Western international actors, has repeatedly failed to dismantle deeply rooted structural clientelism and historical traditions of governance informality, allowing corruption to persist at exceptionally elevated levels (Bieber, 2011; Chandler, 2010). Former EU officials, including former EU Special Representative Pieter Feith, noted that EULEX's restricted capacity to decisively address these pathologies stemmed in part from an absence of a unified strategic vision and insufficient political backing from key EU member states and the

United States, where adopting a confrontational approach toward the Kosovo political establishment was deliberately avoided out of fear of triggering regional instability (Radin, 2013; Özkanca, 2017).

Although EULEX initiated its first high-priority organized crime cases in January 2010 and high-ranking public corruption investigations in July of that same year, subsequent mission reporting consistently pointed to corruption as the primary destabilizing force undermining the rule of law (Zupančič et al., 2018; KIPRED, 2014). Anti-corruption efforts over the past decade and a half were heavily circumscribed by shifting political circumstances and the capacity of domestic political elites to systematically obstruct institutional processes (Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017). Systemic corruption and the tight nexus between political elites and organized crime networks effectively paved the way for what independent monitoring bodies and the European Court of Auditors have termed a "captured state" (European Court of Auditors, 2012; KIPRED, 2014). Throughout the protracted course of the Brussels Dialogue, numerous active legal cases targeting high-ranking officials from major governing factions—such as the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)—were suspended or shelved due to explicit political threats from party leaders to collapse governing coalitions or boycott normalization talks with Belgrade (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; KIPRED, 2014).

Consequently, rather than enforcing uniform adherence to the rule of law, EULEX was frequently compelled to pragmatically adapt its operational actions to immediate political expediencies, resulting in a highly selective approach to prosecuting corruption (Visoka, 2016; Boijmans, 2014). Prominent political actors, including former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), were frequently shielded from rigorous judicial scrutiny, which severely damaged the mission's credibility as an impartial arbiter of justice (Visoka, 2016). Furthermore, after 2014, with the political ascendancy of the Serb List in northern municipalities, informal boundaries separating "Serbian" and "Kosovan" administrative and illicit structures began to blur, leading to complex institutional intertwinements (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Krasniqi, 2014). Motivated heavily by mutual access to public budgetary funds and local political hegemony, investigators documented numerous instances of cross-ethnic political collusion in grand corruption schemes between Kosovo Serb and Albanian elites (KIPRED, 2014; GLPS, 2014). Recent civil society analyses emphasize that systematically dismantling corruption at the central level in Prishtina remains an indispensable legal and moral prerequisite for launching credible anti-corruption measures even within majority-Serb municipalities (EPLO, 2015; KIPRED, 2014).

The undeniable reality that the vast majority of high-level corruption and organized crime prosecutions never culminated in definitive, final judicial convictions exposed a profound structural asymmetry between the EU's ambitious strategic declarations and its actual operational leverage within the local environment (Radin, 2013; Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012). In pursuing its reform agenda, EULEX and the wider European Union frequently found themselves forced into operational cooperation with local political elites who possessed no genuine institutional interest in undertaking transformative reforms (Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017). Moreover, the internal institutional credibility of EULEX was severely tarnished by internal corruption scandals (Visoka, 2016). In November 2017, former EULEX judge Malcolm Simmons publicly resigned, launching serious allegations of internal corruption, administrative malpractice, and severe political interference by senior mission leadership (Visoka, 2016). The official institutional response from EULEX minimized these disclosures by asserting that Simmons himself was the subject of internal investigations regarding professional misconduct, dismissing his allegations as a coordinated disinformation campaign (Visoka, 2016). Ultimately, this accumulation of systemic institutional weaknesses, internal scandals, and compromised anti-corruption initiatives resulted in a profound erosion of public trust in the mission's independence and efficacy (KCSS, 2013–2018; Zupančič et al., 2018).

Limitations, Paradoxes, and Local Perceptions

The ongoing deployment and mandate adjustments of EULEX can be understood as an instrumental manifestation of the European Union's broader foreign policy framework, closely aligned with its theoretical identity as a normative actor in international relations (Manners, 2002; Tocci, 2007). This normative paradigm actively promotes the establishment of transparent, functional, and inclusive public institutions grounded firmly in the foundational values of liberal democracy, constitutionalism, and human rights protection (Tocci, 2007; Anastasakis, 2005). Although EULEX's official mandate was explicitly crafted to strengthen Kosovo's institutional foundations as a vital prerequisite for long-term regional stability, democratization, and socio-economic development, the operational reality on the ground revealed acute structural contradictions (Spernbauer, 2019; Zupančič et al., 2018). Specifically, the executive phase of EULEX was heavily dominated by a top-down approach to normative action through the direct delivery of law enforcement and judicial services, which inadvertently marginalized domestic institutions and stunted the organic growth of local administrative capacity (Radin, 2013; Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017). This strategy operated on the unproven assumption that long-term oversight and gradual inclusion would naturally culminate in professional empowerment; however, the empirical record demonstrates that the eventual transfer of executive competencies to domestic authorities was characterized by hesitation, institutional resistance, and limited efficacy (Cierco & Reis, 2014; Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017). The mission's operational reach was further hampered by deeply entrenched ethnic polarization and regional fragmentation, particularly in northern Kosovo (Bieber, 2011; Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012). Although EULEX functioned locally as a de facto law enforcement and security presence—and maintained formal working relations with the Kosovo Police—perceptions of institutional bias and political partiality remained exceptionally high among the local Serbian community (Özkanca, 2017; KCSS, 2013–2018). Members of the Serb population consistently viewed EULEX as a partisan actor tacitly advancing Prishtina's state-building agenda rather than acting as a neutral guardian of public safety (Özkanca, 2017; Visoka, 2016). This pervasive sentiment was heavily reinforced following specific security incidents, such as the reported physical mistreatment of local citizens in North Mitrovica in October 2024, which prompted regional Serbian non-governmental organizations and political representatives to formally announce the total suspension of cooperation with the mission in protest against perceived discriminatory treatment and the excessive use of force by the Kosovo Police (EULEX Kosovo, 2022–2024; KCSS, 2013–2018). Despite EULEX's ongoing efforts to stabilize the Basic Court in North Mitrovica and conduct routine public order patrols, northern municipalities continued to suffer from a persistent security vacuum that exacerbated inter-ethnic hostility and institutional fragility (Zupančič et al., 2018; Spernbauer, 2019). Within the expert community, the coercive police and judicial powers originally vested in EULEX—similar to the military capabilities of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)—were recognized as critical instruments for shaping security dynamics and influencing local power distributions; however, the inherent friction generated by these coercive measures against local expectations was rarely factored into the mission's strategic planning (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Chandler, 2010). Public perceptions of EULEX across both major ethnic groups display profound historical evolution and persistent ambivalence (KCSS, 2013–2018; Özkanca, 2017):

- **The Kosovo Albanian Community:** Initially, EULEX was welcomed with high expectations, largely driven by the assumption that its arrival supported Kosovo's statehood aspirations and prioritized essential judicial reforms and anti-corruption measures (Visoka, 2016; Krasniqi, 2014). Over time, however, public sentiment soured as successive geopolitical compromises between Belgrade and Prishtina led the EU to prioritize short-term security management and regional stability over deep, structural

rule-of-law transformations (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Visoka, 2016). This perceived subordination of justice to realpolitik led a significant segment of the Albanian public to view EULEX increasingly as a conservative instrument preserving an unsatisfactory political status quo rather than driving radical societal modernization (Visoka, 2016; Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017).

- **The Kosovo Serb Community:** Conversely, the Serbian population maintained a deeply skeptical and resistant posture toward the mission from its inception (Özkanca, 2017; KCSS, 2013–2018). Although the Government of Serbia granted formal initial consent for the deployment of EULEX under specific conditions, local Serbian institutions and civil society viewed the mission's operational integration with Kosovo authorities as an implicit recognition of Kosovo's independence (Özkanca, 2017; Weller, 2009). Consequently, formal cooperation between Belgrade and EULEX was largely restricted to technical channels and information exchange through an official liaison office in Belgrade (Spernbauer, 2019). While pragmatic elements within the Serbian professional public acknowledged that EULEX occasionally served as an insulated buffer against direct political interference and afforded a minimal layer of protection for minority rights, the prevailing public consensus dismissed the mission as structurally biased and politically compromised (Özkanca, 2017; Zupančič et al., 2018).

Conclusion and Regional Implications

An exhaustive examination of European Union institutional reports and independent evaluations indicates that official EULEX communications were predominantly engineered to project a positive image of institutional progress to domestic and international audiences, frequently resulting in an idealized portrayal of mission achievements that diverged sharply from ground realities (Radin, 2013; Příhoda, 2020). This optimistic bias can be structurally interpreted as a political necessity designed to shield EU member states that recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from acknowledging the severe limitations of their state-building project (Weller, 2009; Visoka, 2016). Consequently, annual progress reports and institutional self-assessments must be subjected to rigorous academic scrutiny rather than accepted at face value (Radin, 2013; European Court of Auditors, 2012).

Viewed through the analytical lens of its actual contribution to sustainable peacebuilding, institutional development, and the rule of law, EULEX achieved measurable localized successes—particularly in technical capacity building, professionalizing police procedures, and establishing foundational legal infrastructure (Zupančič et al., 2018; Spernbauer, 2019). However, it fundamentally failed to achieve its overarching strategic mandate: creating a fully functional, politically independent, and impartial judiciary (Radin, 2013; Cierco & Reis, 2014). Pervasive criticisms regarding selective prosecutions, systemic political meddling, and internal mission opacity severely eroded public confidence and relativized its operational achievements (Visoka, 2016; KCSS, 2013–2018). As Kosovo navigates its complex transitional phase toward the eventual termination of the mission's mandate, local institutions are formally expected to assume full responsibility for internal security and judicial administration (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2019). Yet, current empirical indicators suggest that domestic institutions frequently project an artificial facade of functionality and professionalism that far exceeds their actual operational capacities (European Commission, 2023–2024; GLPS, 2014). This discrepancy complicates accurate assessments of readiness and creates a misleading impression of institutional maturity (Demjaha & Bislimi, 2017).

Ultimately, EULEX's primary historical function manifested through its role as a diplomatic and operational communication bridge in inter-ethnic relations between Kosovo and Serbia (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Zupančič et al., 2018). Despite this mediating function,

the mission proved largely incapable of effectively investigating ethnically motivated violence, guaranteeing secure living conditions for minority communities, or fostering genuine societal reconciliation at the grassroots level, where fear remains an everyday reality for Kosovo Serbs (Özkanca, 2017; Boijmans, 2014). The widespread local conviction that the true volume of inter-ethnic violence and harassment—particularly in northern municipalities—substantially exceeds official institutional reporting underscores a profound credibility gap (KCSS, 2013–2018; Zupančič et al., 2018). The overarching objectives of transitional justice, including comprehensive war crimes accountability and the resolution of missing persons cases, yielded severely restricted results (Subotić, 2013).

Despite the long-term presence of EULEX under the CSDP framework, persistent security vulnerabilities continue to pose severe risk factors not only for Kosovo but for the broader Western Balkan geopolitical space (Bieber, 2011; Zupančič et al., 2018). Pervasive ethnic polarization, chronic institutional weakness, widespread distrust in judicial integrity, and periodic escalations of violence—such as the violent clashes in Zvečan in May 2023 and the armed confrontation in Banjska that resulted in four fatalities—illustrate the profound limitations of civilian mission deployment in deeply divided, politicized environments (Zupančič et al., 2018; European Commission, 2023–2024). The trajectory of EULEX vividly demonstrates that external normative power and technical institution-building are inherently constrained when unaccompanied by genuine domestic political commitments to accountability, the dismantling of captured state structures, and authentic inter-ethnic reconciliation (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Visoka, 2016).

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