

FOUCAULT'S ARCHEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ON MAN AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HUMAN SCIENCES AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Kushtrim AHMETI

*Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Tetova, Republic of North Macedonia
Corresponding Author e-mail: kushtrim.ahmeti@unite.edu.mk*

Abstract

Michel Foucault is a French thinker of the philosophical realm of last century's 60s and 70s, who is considered a postmodernist and poststructuralist. Although he regards himself a product of modern tradition, his works present a comprehensive and original critique, precisely of this way of thinking. With his ideas he wanted to make a clear distinction from other prior tendencies, thus joining the voice of other postmodern theorists who sought to demonstrate the alternatives, offered by the then modern philosophical systems, as extremely humanistic.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Foucault's archaeological analysis of the human being and to establish its relationship to the human sciences, which studies the human being as an organism, an economic producer, and as a creator of language, as well as to anthropology, which enables the re-actualization of the general critique. The interpretation will be carried out through content analysis- data reduction by categorization-reduction of all qualitative material in order to identify certain consistent meanings.

Keywords: The human, human sciences, archaeological analysis, anthropology

Introduction

The starting point of Foucault's thinking on man, as a subject of philosophy and the human sciences, appears when the classical field of representation is demolished, transforming humanity into the subject of modern science.

Unlike other philosophers, who usually begin with the human relationship with the being, the world, and God, Foucault considers as a starting point the fact that different people are made by something that is understood and by what they say and treat as the truth, or better said most people are dead, given that everything they can do or say extends over different eras (Veyne, 2008).

The status of the subject, shaped in a new realm of temporality and infinity, is endangered as the god of knowledge in its sovereignty, is already maintained through the reconstruction of the transcendental form.

According to Foucault, objectivism and subjectivism are not independent of each other, from their mutual development and relations arise those games of truth which filter out the assertion they underline as true (Florence, 2001).

This developmental defect between the subject and object, with one constantly overruling the other, results in the subject is the author overturning the rules of speech within the same provisions, or within the scientific community itself.

Such constitution of the object, where the subject is placed as its equal, is not made by the fact that we ourselves are human subjects, nor is his thought, is freedom subjected to those provisions, but rather, in order to place the point on the fixation according to which the subject precedes it with its role (although there doesn't exist a subject in its "wild state", which would be empty and inauthentic).

In fact, according to Foucault, nowhere in history can the universal form of the pure subject be found, thus we are dealing with some sort of the end or death of the subject (Florence, 2001).

The archeological analysis of Foucault on the man and its relationship with the human sciences

In his archaeological analysis, Foucault presents the birth of the man as a discursive construct. The man, an object of philosophy and the humanities (psychology, sociology, and literature) emerges when the classical field of representation is destroyed and humans for the first time become not only the most distant subjects of representation, but also the object of modern scientific research, and ultimately a historically determined being who must explore his abilities to live, work and speak.

Most of Foucault's works deal with the late 18th century, when most of the human sciences emerged, treating the man as the central subject of study, since the man himself was constituted in the Western culture as the one who should be named and should be recognized (Foucault M., 1966).

The 19th century marks the appearance of sciences such as biology, political economy, and philology, which study the man as an organism, economic producer, and creator of language. This placed the human figure as the object of recognition as a man who speaks, who works, who makes tools and machines, a man who lives; a fact which, to Foucault, does not represent a progressive step. On the contrary, he developed new groups of subjects, new objects which include new spaces of knowledge, that is, the emergence of new epistemologies.

"I would say that understanding life is not a scientific notion, but an epistemological indicator of the effect that the classifying, restrictive, and other scientific discussions have had and not in its subject [...] It seems to me that understanding the human nature in the history of knowledge had primarily played the role of the epistemological indicator in defining certain types of discourses in relation to or in opposition to theology, biology or history. I would find it difficult to see a scientific notion there" (Chomsky & Foucault, 2001).

He takes biology as an example - there we can find notions with classifying functions, notions with differentiating functions, and notions with analytic functions: some of them

enable us to describe objects such as tissues, the others to isolate elements such as inherited features, and the thirds to determine the role of the reflex.

“At the same time, there are elements that play a role in the discourse and internal rules of thought. But there are also peripheral meanings, such that the scientific practice defines, differentiates from other practices, limits the subject area and determines what the tonality of future tasks is”.

In this global restoration of the epistemic of human sciences, due to the proximity, any chance of reaching the true scientific status is lost, because, according to Foucault, they cannot be considered as science due to certain situations of proximity to biology, economics, or philology:

"They exist only if they are located there, near them, or beneath them, in the space created by their projection" (Foucault M., 1966).

In fact, these three new domains of recognition will appear in place of the three previous ones which were developed in the classical epistemic: general grammar, wealth analysis, and history of nature.

He insists that a discipline is not the sum of all that can be said to be the truth in relation to neither something, nor the totality that is accepted in the name of a principle of coherence or systematization in relation to the same data.

“Medicine does not consist of the sum of what can be said to be the truth about a disease; botany cannot be defined as the sum of all truths about plants. And for this there are two reasons: first of all, botany or medicine, like any other discipline, are made up of mistakes and truths, mistakes that are not waste or foreign bodies, but that have positive functions, historical efficacy, a role often inseparable from the role of truths” (Foucault M., 2009).

Foucault also insists on highlighting the role that the social sciences play in the disciplinary process: “The modern punishments can no longer claim to be punishing crimes, it affirms to be re-adapting delinquents. It will soon be 200 years of how they live by and interact with the social sciences. This speaks about his pride, or it is even about his way of not embarrassing himself. Maybe I, the punishment, am still not quite right: bear with it a bit longer to see how I will become scientific (Foucault M., 2011).

Also, belonging to a certain discipline, according to Foucault, implies engaging in a kind of a theoretical horizon, within the limits of which there are true and false propositions. But it pushes beyond its scope a whole teratology of knowledge because it- the discipline is a control principle of the production of discourse and it is the one that fixes the limits through an identity that has the form of permanent re-actualization of rules.

According to Foucault, our civilization is the one that has respected the discourse more than anyone else. It has universally radicalized and liberated it from any coercion in order to keep it under control. It is precisely the great flourishing of discourse, that its wealth may be relieved of its most dangerous part, and that its order may be organized according to figures which remove the most uncontrollable:

“Discourse is nothing but the reflection of a truth that is emerging before one's own eyes, and as everything can finally take the form of discourse, as everything can be said and that discourse can be carried out in relation to everything, this happens because all the things that

have manifested and exchanged their meaning can enter the silent interior of self-consciousness” (Foucault M., 2009).

Since in any kind of philosophy, be it a philosophy of the underlying subject, a philosophy of the original experience, or a philosophy of universal mediation, discourse is nothing more than a game, writing in the first case, reading in the second, and exchange in the third. This exchange, this reading, this writing, never inserts anything into play but signs, thus annihilating it in its reality, and engaging in the order of the marker.

In other words, according to Foucault, the "man" who appears in the 18th-century thought is a creation of discourse and not a creative being in the face of dominating rules: one who does not speak at all but is spoken of.

“Man is the last discovery, to whom the archeology of our thought easily proves the date of his creation. Maybe even the near end” (Foucault M., 1966).

The very notion of the human essence, of the truth of specific individuals, is the product of discourse itself, while the idea of our individuality is a historical creation, whose understanding means the understanding of the dual process of subjectivity: as in the sense of creating subjectivity as well as in the sense of halting the dependence on the discourse.

“Undoubtedly, for our culture will remain crucial the fact that the first speech delivered on the individual had to go through the moment of death. The issue is that the Western man could not, in his own eyes, be listed as an object of science, so he went into the interior of his own language and being himself in it and with the help of the language, he ensured the discursive existence, even through the reference of the destruction of himself: from the study of mindlessness all the psychologies were born, from the placement of death into the medical thought, medicine was born, which is demonstrated as a science on the individual ”(Foucault M., 1963).

However, Foucault acknowledges the special place of psychoanalysis and ethnology, as structuralism had defined them by giving them a privileged status of "anti-sciences", because unlike other humanities which begin from the opposite direction, they do not stop to resolve the man, who in the human sciences creates and renews his positivity:

"For both of these sciences we can say what Lévi-Strauss says about ethnology: they destroy the man. While above those two anti-sciences or alongside them, the third would upset the field of humanities, and disputes the more general way: linguistics. By lying about what enabled the man to become known, the three together carry a certain risk. Thus, the fate of the man develops before our eyes, but develops in the opposite direction, with a strange twist, the man returns to his birth, to the native city that has made this possible. But isn't that the way he touches his bottom? Doesn't linguistics speak about the man himself more than psychoanalysis and ethnology? ”(Foucault M., 1966).

But the birth of positive medicine, of the whole science that caused the medical practice to hide in the realm of samples, such coming of a new knowledge comes simultaneously and in relation to the interdependence with a more general evolution, which in every contemporary culture, puts death at the heart of the individual:

"Experiencing individuality in modern culture is perhaps related to experiencing death: from Emepdokle of Helderlin to Zarathustra and then to the Freudian man a persistent relationship to death is universally regulated so as to be a particular face and gives each word power in

order to be heard all the way to infinity in a way that may seem unusual at the first sight, the movement which upholds the 19th century liberalism is the same one from which the man gains positive recognition about itself; but it should be surprising that the figure of knowledge and the figure of language obey the same profound law, and that the attack of limitation is equally pending on the same relation of the man with death which approves the rational scientific discourse, while there it opens up a source of language which infinitely expands into the void created by the absence of the Gods "(Foucault M., 1963).

This contradiction of experience, regarding contemporary culture, perhaps is also a warning of the end of the epiphany which marked the appearance of man in knowledge: "Only one thing is for sure: man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem posed to human knowledge. Serving a relatively short chronology and a limited geographical curse – the European culture of the sixteenth century- we can say that the man is the only recent discovery. Knowledge's are neither early nor secretly moved around him and his riddles ... Man is the last discovery that the archeology of our thoughts can easily confirm its date. Maybe even the near ending" (Foucault M., 1966).

Foucault thinks in Nietzsche's words when he says that all notions are created, and further demands as far as possible to avoid the anthropological universals by researching them in their historical constitution and searching in the archives of mankind to find them in the roots of modest and grandiose convictions, under the name of genealogy, which is also taken from Nietzsche.

Foucault and the anthropology

Foucault is for the destruction of all concrete forms of anthropological prejudice, which would enable the re-actualization of the general critique of the mind. According to him the emergence of a constitutive subject is a humanistic mystique that impedes the critical exploration of the various institutional sites in which subjects are created within power relations frameworks (Best & Kelner, 1996).

The concept of the human essence, the truth of specific individuals, is the product of discourse, the idea of individuality being a historical creature, while its understanding of Foucault is a dual process of subjectivity both in the sense of its creation and even in the sense of stopping (subjected) the discourse itself. "Western culture in the name of the human constituted a being that for the same reasons must be the positive domain of knowledge and cannot be the object of science" (Foucault M., 1966).

In this way he acknowledges the possibility of individual resistance by asserting that the individual subject is not the product of only one discourse, is not thrown into the prison of dominant meanings, but to a certain extent is inter-discursive with the ability to question and challenge the types of definitions by using one system of meanings against another system. And yet Foucault's intention was not for the individual to be understood as a non-problematic biological being, but finally to understand that the individual subject acts like a focus (Weeks, 1982).

He also uses the subject in revising his holistic positioning from the time of "Words and Stuff". According to him, the field of declaration should not be understood as a translation of certain operations carried out elsewhere, because this field has been sent neither to an individual subject, nor to the collective consciousness, nor to any transcendental subject, but must be described as an anonymous field whose configuration determines the proper place of the subject that talks". (Foucault, 2010).

Yet, even in this work, the notion subject itself is synonymous for arbitrariness, and in addition almost everywhere at the "Archeology of Knowledge" also uses the other notion of "genius", which for Foucault represents the highest manifestation of subjectivity.

Such a radical restriction of the subject's role calls into doubt his assertion that "Discourse", is not an extraterrestrial form, but completely something historical", as he likewise asserts that it regulates discursive practice "the set of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in time and space" (Foucault, 2010).

According to him, the subject is not constituted: it is found as the object itself, but is equally free to react thanks to his freedom and to withdraw thanks to his opinion.

Even though closely perceived is not sovereign, the free subject is however ascertained, a process which Foucault will call "subjectivization": the subject is not natural, in each age it is shaped by the dispositions and discourse of the moment, the reactions of their individual liberty, and the possible aesthetics.

The constitution of the subject is similar to the constitution of its modes: man is found and finds himself as a faithful vassal, as a loyal subordinate, a righteous citizen, etc. and the same disposition that constitutes those objects, sex, the natural sciences, the leader, of each itself makes a certain subject.

As for us, without discourse the object would not be known, there would also be no human subject without subjectivism (Veyne, 2008).

Foucault was not an enemy of man and human subject, as was thought: it simply held that that subject cannot remove from heaven any absolute truth, nor do sovereign works affect the heaven of truth; they can only respond to the truth and reality of their era in an innovative way. Few words can accurately define the human condition, to the freedom with which it could react to infinity, Foucaultism is in fact an empirical anthropology which is coherent and original based on historical criticism.

In fact, the use of the notion of subjectivization is for the purpose of eliminating metaphysics and empirical-transcendental mixing, from which the ascertained subject derives the appearance of subject sovereignty.

Because this notion according to Foucault has the same position in society as the notion of habitus of Bourdieu, converted couple between social and individual, or as the sociological notion of role, indicates the intention of separating the subject from its content from it to form an empty form, ready to be set as a transcendental duplicate of the empirical subject. Foucault, from this process of subjectivism also resolves another process which he calls an aestheticization, implying the initiative to transform itself into himself (Foucault M., 2001).

In fact, around 1980 it was found that in addition to the techniques applied to things and those directed at others, some societies, including the Greco-Roman, also knew the technique that worked for itself, (Foucault M., 2001), thereby exploiting aesthetics to spare out the spontaneity of this initiative which runs counter to subjectivism.

Conclusion

Foucault, without declaring, participates in a great discussion on modern thought: whether or not truth is equal with its object, resembles or does not resemble what was discussed, as the sane mind thinks? The truth about the will is not apparent to determine

whether they resemble each other or not, because we have no other source of information that enables us to review it.

For Foucault, as for Nietzsche, William James, Austin, Wittgenstein, Ian Hacking and many others, all with their own views, knowledge cannot be a faithful mirror of reality. Foucault believes nothing more than Richard Rorty, does not believe in that mirror, in that "speculative" definition of knowledge; according to him the object in its materiality cannot be separated from the formal framework through which we know it and which Foucault calls discourse. Everything is in it" (Veyne, 2008).

Unlike Heidegger, in some of the texts he has reviewed, Foucault is not very discreet, although he does not want to talk about man in general, but says that: "Life with man came to a living being which is never correctly located in its place, in the living being whose destiny is to deceive endlessly" (Veyne, 2008).

It is deceiving in that discourse enables only that empirical, visible, and human being to be known, however, it believes in general or meta-empirical ideas, it also deceiving because everything people think and how they act, their societies, their cultures, are fundamentally changed from epoch to epoch, for nothing transcendent even the transcendental is guided by the unforeseen existence of humanity.

Deviating from the creative role and analyzing it as a complicated and changing function of discourse are Foucault's salvation for the throwing of the active subject and thus the introduction of new forms of thinking, which, in his view, also means opening doors to postmodernism.

So Foucault's final goal is to attain the freedom of the individual, which requires the destruction of the subject itself as an immutable human essence that precedes all social operations, by which would come out of his creative role.

I believe in the freedom of the individual. In the same situation people react in different ways" (Foucault M., 2001).

Because "The individual is undoubtedly a fictitious atom of an ideological image of society, but it is also a reality fabricated by that particular technology of power called discipline" (Foucault M., 2011).

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