CIVILIZATION, IDEOLOGY AND GEOPOLITICS AFTER THE FALL OF BISMARCK WITH WORLD WAR I ACTORS, USA AND RUSSIA

Gurakuç KUÇI [1]

[1*] *PhD. Cand.at University of Tetovo, North Macedonia*
Corresponding author e-mail: gurakuqkuqi@gmail.com

Abstract

Civilization, ideology and geopolitics (CIG) are three complementary and non-parallel concepts that provide an analytical and strategic alternative for states and for science while analyzing planning and forecasting the international relations. This is indeed a short and immediate conclusion about the paper but an acute statement with a high relevance.

Usually theoretical complementarities are practices that are rarely used but the paper seeks to investigate and look deeper at the relationship of these concepts with each other and how they are related. However, these three concepts come to light right after 1890, when Bismarck falls from power, in that period there was an urgent call for the public opinion to get informed about the Reinsurance agreement between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia.

The collapse of conservatism gave space to public opinion and this paper argues the emergence and implementation of the CIG. This paper is a part of my doctoral dissertation and in this paper the theories are presented shorter than in my doctoral thesis elaboration. This paper also briefly investigates and explores the cooperation of nations before the First World War occurred.

Keywords: ideology, geopolitics, civilization, public opinion, nationalism, First World War, Slavs

1. Introduction

Realism, liberalism, geopolitics, civilization and ideology, helped in the creation of some circumstances, their implementation was mostly apparent mainly in the last decade of the XIX century and in the first quarter of the XX century. The debate over *liberalism and realism* in international relations started with US President Woodrow Wilson in the famous book of Edward Carr called "20 Years of Crisis" in 1919. While the geopolitics started with Rudolf Kjellen in 1899, in the other hand the theory of civilization started with Oswald Spengler in 1926, as a result the ideologies where perceived as such as William Albig argues (Albig, 1956), due to the public opinion. The main question is how this period enabled the emergence and the implementation of civilization, ideology and geopolitics (CIG)?

In this paper we will explain and analyze why these three concepts mentioned above developed approximately in a certain historical timeline more or less in the same period for all nations in international relations.

Until the end of 19th century the public opinion was considered a hazard phenomenon for the nation states governments but this was not the same when it came to foreign policy. Regarding it is of a great importance to mention John Lock; in his book called "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" he believed and stated that there are three laws where man is subject:

the divine law, the civil law and the law of opinion or reputation. According to Locke, the law of opinion or reputation is most important because it is considered that negative thinking and negative impression will force people to adapt their behavior to social norms. According to this Lock did not consider public opinion as an appropriate influence for governments but the adaptation of behavior would be equated with the primitive thought of the crowd. This impressive thought of John Lock continued to prevail until the fall of Otto von Bismarck 1890. While Bismarck was the Chancellor of Germany, he made Germany the balance bearer in Europe. It had also restrained Germany from imperialist expansion; during his leadership Bismarck used public opinion on several occasions for the interests of the Empire.

The French Revolution failed its mission and did not succeed to influence the public opinion because the aristocracy continued to stay in power. François Furet a French historian considers that after the French Bourgeois Revolution the aristocracy didn't disappear but at the same time the bourgeoisie couldn't dominate the arena and both social classes survived contradictions but often confronted when it came to politics. Furet says …*throughout the nineteenth century, yesterday's opponent, the aristocrat, still shows some beautiful remnants: it is Bismarck who realizes the German union and Kavuri the Italian union. To a large extent, the kings and nobles of Europe widely hold the reins of an evolution whose meaning they fear. Even in France, where the old regime has been legally overthrown from head to toe and where civil equality has been irreversibly installed since August 4, 1789, the nobility still knows many beautiful days after the fall of Napoleon. It rains above high society and has a major role in governing the country, even after 1830. Thus, more or less de facto took root throughout Europe in nineteenth-century, a degraded version of what classical political thought called 'mixed governance', leaving its mark on monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. In* this *bastard political situation, the anti-bourgeois passion met its limits" (Furet, 2003, p. 26).*

Therefore, according to Furet's argument, the aristocracy being in power couldn't allow the development of the public opinion during this period of time while maintaining these attitudes; a crucial role was played by Bismarck, who created balances of power and enabled the control of public opinion by making alliances to defeat revolutionaries.

However, in order to elaborate the fact of how and why public opinion emerged in the post-1890 period, we will elaborate a brief explanation and analysis of how Bismarck used the power and public opinion; how its decline enabled the imbalance, and how it impacted the public opinion and emergence and influence of geopolitics, ideology and civilization.

How Bismarck used the public opinion to protect the Prussian Empire interest and the unification of Germany?

Bismarck had high influence and reputation on public opinion, he used the letter of France addressed to the German emperor, on the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollerin-Sigmaringen for the crown of Spain (Rich, 2006, p. 211).-213).

This candidacy will result in strengthening the German Emperor with whom, Bismarck enjoyed a diplomatic relation. Nevertheless, this was not accepted by the French, the failure of Bismarck's plan to put Europe before an act of *fait accompli* was prevented and opposed by an error of a priest in the Prussian diplomatic mission in Madrid (Rich, 2006, pp. 211-213). This error in the code allowed the Spanish parliament to adjourn the session up to June 24, 1870.

This caused the news to take hold and Bismarck's plan to be opposed, because he planned this news to be published right after voting in the parliament (Rich, 2006, pp. 211-213). By setting public opinion on fire regarding this issue, France threatened Prussia with declaration for war on July 6, in case if it will not withdraw its candidacy, something which was accepted without opposing. This, without a doubt was a diplomatic and public victory for France, but France's request for the Prussian Emperor to write a letter to French emperor and to apologize by

showing respect for disapproving Leopold's candidacy was an exaggerated act which w=was used politically by Bismarck (Rich, 2006, pp. 211-213). On this issue and the rejection of France's request, the Prussian emperor on the same day notified Bismarck who received the letter and he edited it and gave it to the press. This was a public humiliation for France and for their emperor Napoleon III, this without a doubt was a kind of disorientation of public opinion and at the same time and incited hate but later will be a strategy exploited for the interest of *raison d'état.*

Bismarck had also used British public opinion in a similar way to keep it as an ultimate or a latter option for the Franco-Prussian war. To prevent the Gladstone government from making any move on behalf of France, Bismarck gave the London Times the Benedictine agreement of 1866, with its predictions of France taking over Belgium and Luxembourg, which was published on July 25, 1870 (Rich, 2006, p. 213). Bismarck used public opinion and liberals, (Gryzanovski, 1871), but at no point did he pursue their interests as Norman Rich confirms in the book "Diplomacy of the Great Powers: 1814-1914", respectively in the chapter "Union of Germany".

Public opinion had its liberal development in Britain and in USA, but both states had isolationist attitude back then. They had no commitment to extend or impose their values outside their borders. In Europe, Bismarck was trying to impose values and show power in front of the European continent. When Wilhelm II came to power, he had liberal mindset and dismissed Bismarck in 1890 which resulted with withdrawal from Reinsurance Agreement. Wilhelm II opened schools all over Germany, reduced the taxes on newspapers and advertisements which resulted on expansion of reading, he industrialized the country and left space for knowledge and, because he found a public opinion which was manipulated for the sake of nationalism *lebensraum* (these reforms by Bismarck were actually undertaken against communism).

Bismarck	Wilhelm II
	OP creator
User of public opinion	OP implementator
Conservative	Liberal

Thus, the strengthening of public opinion in one of the three conservative powers meant that nationalism made to heard public opinion, an opinion that could be easily manipulated and mainly with pamphlets and slogans, which the pursuit of this opinion brought imperialism. This brings us to the fact that Bismarck was a manipulator of public opinion, while Wilhelm II was a listener and implementer of what public opinion believes. Here we are faced with the fact that this opinion would bring new circumstances between the powers which maintained the balance in Europe.

After the creation of these new circumstances, the theories of geopolitics, civilization and re-treatment of ideology and their influence, certainly these theories were not derivatives of changing the circumstances of public opinion, but they emerged as a result of scientific, political and economic progress but however their implementation was possible with the help of public opinion and with the support of new ideologies.

The research question of the paper is: How did the three conceptual complementarities of CIG developed? The paper's hypothesis is: The CIG has theoretical and practical complimentarily from 1890 until the end of the First World War and it has found the foundations of its political development. The dependent variable of the paper is: theoretical and practical complementarities of CIG.

2. CIG three conceptual theorizing and theoretical level

Before proceeding to the theoretical examination of these three concepts, we must specify the theoretical level.

Forms of theories have always aimed to go towards the general, finding a model that covers theoretical and empirical explanation. In this regard Karl Popper has two versions of synthetic attitudes: strict universal and numerical universal (Popper, 1992, p. 40). Strict universal attitudes lay down theoretical hypotheses which include the theoretical wholeness or generality of the Keynesian form. It was Keynes who first attempted to develop a global economic theory. In the political sciences such an attempt was made by David Easton. He said: "The study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative decisions are made and implemented within a society. [...] every broad part of the political canvas does not stand alone [...] no part can be fully understood without referring to the way in which it operates as a whole" (Easton, 1957, pp. 383-400). In international relations, attempts were made in this direction in order to create a general theory mainly by two realists such as Neibhur and Tellis, who adopted realism as a general theory of politics. It has long been the ambition of rationalists, especially neo-realists, […] for most constructivists, such ambitions have little allure. (Reus-Smit,2005, p. 202). Theorists of the history of civilizations are always based on building a general theory of the rise and fall of civilizations. Popper and Aron (Aron, 1967) didn't support the idea of having a general theory, as they concluded that deduction leaves theoretical inaccuracies. But Fukuyama in his book "The Beginnings of the Political Order" says "What I'm aiming for in this book is a middle-range theory that avoids the pitfalls both of excessive abstraction (the vice of economists) and excessive particulars' (the problem of many historians and anthropologists)" (Fukuyama, 2008, p. 25).

Therefore, in our case, we will try to avoid unnecessary historical details in the theoretical, historical and analytical explanation and to make theoretical generalizations which do not apply in the global level like that of historians of civilizations or economists, but which are regional where in addition to the division of civilizations also enter the ideological and geopolitical divisions. Within this we come to the middle theoretical explanation, as no civilization, region or state can implement a comprehensive global geopolitical framework because there is no totalitarian hegemony.

3. Theory of civilizations, their morphological significance and nationalism

Civilization is considered to be a complex society characterized by urban development, social stratification imposed by a cultural elite, symbolic systems of communication, and a perceived division over the dominance of the natural environment (Adams, 2007, p. 23). Spengler says that civilization is the inevitable fate of culture (Spengler, 1926, p. 18). Whereas, Quigley calls civilization the combination of all human beings plus their cultures (Quigley, 1979, p. 162).

Throughout history, humanity has known different stages of development regarding the geography or territory where he/she belonged; in this living geography people have created their own societies and their own methods of communication, existence, food, religion, art, science and jurisdiction. Each of these societies, by creating their own foundations of physical and spiritual existence they also created a civilization of its own. Over time, the opening of trade routes the migration and imperialism enabled the civilizations to spread more widely and move around, either around themselves or beyond limited geographical spaces. The creation of geographical spaces and the rule of other peoples has enabled if not the physical annihilation then the annihilation of the culture and aspects which have constituted their civilization. The onslaught of a civilization with foreign settlements like the Slavic one in the Balkans proves

the Darwinian element of many centuries later that existence belongs to the strongest in meaning of wild.

Toynbee: Arnold Joseph Toynbee says that humans are being treated by history and politics like creatures that are not living, for which he blamed the industrialization of the mind (Toynbee, 1934, p. 8).

He didn't agree at all with nationalism and said that: The spirit of Nationality is a sour ferment of the new wine of Democracy in the old bottles of Tribalism. The ideal of our modern Western Democracy has been to apply in practical politics the Christian intuition of the fraternity of all Mankind […] the spirit of Nationality is the psychic product of this political *tour deforce;* the spirit of Nationality may be defined (negatively but not inaccurately) as a spirit which makes people feel, act and think about a part of any given society thinking it was the whole of that society (Toynbee, 1937, p. 9).

So, Toynbee considered that nationalism is an exclusionary division and that it must return to its roots, which is civilization, because it considers nations as unstable entities, especially in the secession of small countries. Toynbee gives the first picture that Western civilization should have the core state, unity and that nationalism expresses only the decline of Western power in a world when other civilizations are emerging that know less about nationalism and their authoritarianism expresses unity and victory over democracy, which can also be seen in the statistics of democracy index.

Oswald Spengler and Carrol Quigley have paid particular attention to the *morphology of civilizations.* Spengler said that no historian has encountered morphological relations within a culture ... a metaphysical character. He even accuses Kant of his book "A Critique of Pure Reason".

Spengler wrote that: "Kant, who in his main work established the formal rules of cognition, did not take nature only as the object of reason's activity, and neither he himself, nor anyone after him, noted the reservation. (Spengler, 1926, p. 6). Spengler gives a perspective that the analysis should be made given the historical, chronological and analogical circumstances.

Spengler added that there is a *history of the morphology of the world*, of the *world-as-history* versus the *world-as-nature*, and according to him the world is not become but is becoming, that means that the world is in continuous evolution and this cultural evolution according to Spengler has its origins in Greek culture, which did not document and preserve as the Egyptians (Spengler, 1926, p. 5). Spengler drew attention to the necessity of the evolution of civilizations.

Carrol Quigley also focused on the morphology and evolution of civilizations and saw them as essential to survival. He said that: "The ability of a society to defend itself on the military level is dependent on its ability to provide domestic order on the political level, wealth on the economic level, companionship on the social level, understanding on the intellectual level, and psychic certainly on the religious level" (Quigley, 1979, pp. 119-120).

Quigley continued: "the ability of the society to defend itself affects its ability to achieve the five other goals. This each level is closely connected with all the others. It would be quite impossible to support a mechanized army without a fairly centralized political system. All three authors precede Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, which further develops the theory of the core state (Huntington, 2004, p. 350) said that: "In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations". A kind of regionalism in civilization (Huntington, 2004, p. 28).

4. Reflection on ideology

Ideology has developed as a set of ideas which generally avoids other properties that societies or states may have such as culture, civilization, tradition and anything else that has nothing to do with the rational.

Roucek said that: "Every pattern of thought, every philosophical or other cultural product, belongs to the specific social group which originated and with whose existence it is bound up. These patterns of thought are 'ideologies'" (Roucek, 1944). Jhon Plamentaz said that ideology is: "a set of related beliefs or ideas characteristic of a group or community" (Sullivan, 1973). Micheal Howard added that: "This implies something much broader, looser, and less modifiable: a value system, a 'mind-set' as the Americans might call it, a *Weltanschauung* as the Germans call it, or in the French expression [...] a *mentalite* (Howard, 1989). Marc Regaldo said that: "One can call an Ideologist one who looks at politics as a science based on the analysis of the human mind and especially on the study of the genesis of ideas and feelings" (Regaldo, 2008, p. 104).

So, ideology itself does not exclude history, it implies the human mentality, environment and feelings as Lock and Condillac agreed. (Cassels, 1996, p. 1). Plato can be considered the first communist who in his book *Respublica* had wrote about the transformation of society and communism. But if ontology is an essential element for the implementation of an idea, form or model of government which returns to value, then it was impossible for Plato to implement his ideology as it was something utopian in practice. This does not deprive him of the epistemological and ontological approach to become a scientific theory. The communist ideas of both Marx and Engels actually remain unworkable because they were later adapted by Plehanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and so on. So everyone adapted to the mentality and reality beyond the Platonic utopian surreal extension. In this regard what is suggested to us is that the analysis of ideas and feelings create the ideology which despite the fact that every ideology aims at the creation of the new human being ends up dependent on chronology and history. This dependence of ideology on history and chronology puts us in front of Toynbee's thesis that nationalism and the nation depended on civilization and are artificial creatures while ideology is first a matter of civilization and then geopolitics.

5. Theorizing about geopolitics

The two main geographical environments for geopolitics are *maritimity* and *continentality*. By 1904, Harold John Mackinder gave a lecture on the topic "The Geographical Pivot of History" (Mackinder, 1904). While in the book "Democratic Ideals and Reality", Mackinder stated that: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World" (Mackinder, 1919, p. 106). So Mackinder was talking about the continental (Heartland).

Nicholas J. Spykman in his book "Geography of Peace" said that: "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world" (Spykman, 1944). So by that we can say that Spykman was talking about shore theory or the maritime.

Heartland encompasses Europe, Asia and Africa as the heart of the earth. The islands of the world are the British and Japanese islands and the outer islands as Mackinder considered the areas of North America, South America and Australia.

Mackinder's heartland was compromised by orthodox civilization in Russia, the Islamic civilization, the Christian civilization excluding US, and the civilization of China.

Spykman pointed out that Rimland includes three sections: the European Coast land; the Arabian-Middle Eastern desert land; and the Asiatic monsoon land (Spykman, 1944).

The theory of geopolitics would be supplemented by Friedrich Ratzel with the theory of *lebensraum* (living space), today it is also known as organic theory. Ratzel was influenced by the theory of evolution and the authors Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel. The theory of race also has an influence on this theory, and this theory of Ratzel was used by Nazism and Hitler.

Table 1. Geopolitical scope, the three main theories

Geopolitical Extent		
Mackinder (Heartland)	**Spykman (Rimland)**	***Rener (air power)***
Volga River in Russia	European coast land	Eurasia involving Russia, Siberia, Turkmenistan and Western China
Yangtze River in China	the Arabian-Middle Eastern desert land	
Himalayan Mountains in Nepal	To the Asiatic monsoon land	
Arctic Ocean		

The theory of air power first highlighted by George T. Renner in "Human Geography in the Air Age" (Renner, 1942) was also very important, since 1930, according to Rener, increasing aircraft efficiency has introduced a "three-dimensional world" strategy and a "completely new geography - an aviation creates geography".

Renner added that while "the First World War was a struggle for control of the seas, and was made possible because of the invention of the submarine (Renner, 1942, p. 183), World War was a struggle for world control with special emphasis upon that of the land and the air, made possible by the tank and the airplane (Renner, 1942, p. 183), WWII is being fought primarily to decide the control of the land and the air (Renner, 1942, p. 2016). Renner added that: "The nations which make the best geography for them will control the world" (Renner, 1942, pp. 25-26).

Mackinder, Spykman and Renner are three geopolitical theorists who touch the hearts of civilizations and ideologies with their geopolitics. After the Cold War, Huntington would call these "the clash of civilizations", while Zbiginiev Brezinski would call them "geopolitical whirlwinds". For the issue of Russia, the Middle East, Europe and the Balkans, Brezinski said: "On the map of Eurasia, the geopolitical perimeters of the whirlwind of violence can be drawn in the shape of a rectangle. It stretches from west to east, from the Adriatic Sea wetting the Balkans to the border of China's Xinjiang province; from south to north it arches around the Persian Gulf, including various parts of the Middle East and beyond, to the south, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, then all of Central Asia along the Russian-Kazakh border and to the north, along the Russian-Ukrainian border. Thus the rectangle contains parts of southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf region, in addition to the southern parts of the former Soviet Union"(Brezinski, 1993, p. 165).

While on the issue of China, Brezinski based his argument on Chinese strategists saying: "To counter the tripartite coalition of America, Europe and Japan, the most effective geopolitical counterattack could very well be to try to form a tripartite alliance of its own, which would link China with Iran and the Persian Gulf / Middle East region as well as with Russia in the area of the former Soviet Union. Such an anti-status-quo-is coalition would be a powerful magnet for other states dissatisfied with the status quo" (Brzezinski, 1993, pp. 197-198), as is the case with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Whereas, the second option without such a dramatic role for China is: "seeking to assert itself as the main power of the Far East, it can pose a serious challenge to regional stability.

The far East is already becoming the second area in the world in terms of the largest concentration of modern armaments". (Brzezinski, 1993, pp. 197-198). Brzezinski affirms the geopolitical idea which he claims that it coincides with the detachments of Huntington's civilizations. The existence of these whirlwinds or fault lines expresses its own characteristics of the region, which are those groupings of ideas that are otherwise called ideologies. The overlap of geopolitics, ideology, and civilization, though multilevel rather than parallel, was inevitable for explanations, analyzes, and predictions of international circumstances in a complementary and interdependent world.

For the realization and development of these civilizing, geopolitical and ideological perspectives, a core state must have the characteristics that Saul Bernard Cohen defines. He said that: "a nation's claim to power rests on four pillars such as:

(1) Overwhelming military strength and the willingness to use it;
(2) Surplus economic energy to enable it to provide aid and invest in other states;
(3) Ideological leadership that serves as a model for other nations;
(4) A cohesive system of governance (Cohen, 2014, p. 2).

Based on his analysis, Cohen, said that: "In today's world, three geostrategic realms have evolved: the Atlantic and Pacific economically advanced maritime realm; the Eurasian continental Russian heartland; and the mixed continental-maritime East Asia" (Cohen, 2014, p. 41).

Four pillars of Cohen's dedicated to a superpower, they all merge with Quigley's six points and give a format that civilizations today have a capital of civilization, or that translates in real terms as a core state that has ideological, civilization and geopolitical power within these three concepts provides the synthesis of security for participants.

Once this paper is briefly extracted from the dissertation thesis, then to argue *the CIG three conceptuality,* we will analyze the period from the fall of Bismarck to the First World War leaving the rest of the full paper for publication as a book.

6. From the fall of Bismarck to the First World War

The clash of ideologies in international relations is also closely related to the geopolitical extension in time, space and civilization as we proved in the theoretical part.

The period begins at the end of the XIX century, in 1890 when the Wilhelm II came to power after the fall of Bismarck.

However, the ideological clashes begin in 1917 when US was involved in WWI and with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In 1890, after Wilhelm II came to power as emperor of Germany, he promised many reforms. Wilhelm II embarked on extensive reform in the military and economy, while in foreign policy he always aimed at a coalition with Great Britain (Mommsen, 1990). However, England was a country that intervened in continental Europe only when it had to maintain the status quo, maintain strategic balances and always intervened on the side of the weakest. Wilhelm II wanted a written public agreement, which was not in the ideology and politics of Britain to make such an intervention, Britain pursued an isolationist policy with Europe and had imperialism with Asia, Africa and the Middle East (McLean, 2001). Britain had offered a memorandum of understanding but Germany rejected. This changed Germany's entire policy by building global ground-based strategy *Weltpolitik* and strengthening its fleet *flottenpolitik*. This was the time when science was influenced by the theory of evolution by Charles Darwin, the theory of races and the theory of organic or living space *lebensraum* by the German Friedrich Ratzel.

Bismarck tried to keep the Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary and later Italy in the camp, always calling for the conservatism of the eastern courts, their autocracy and against democratic revolutions, but with the non-extension of the Reinsurance Treaty by Germany after the removal of the Bismarck as chancellor. Germany opened the corridor for new alliance calculations. The France-Russia Alliance in 1891 ended the division of right and left in international politics dating back to 1791 (McLean, 2001).

The breakdown of the reinsurance alliance and the alliance of Russia with France in 1894 showed that the alliance of reinsurance or of the three states now only between Germany, Italy and Austria, in addition to being an alliance of authoritarian monarchies, was also an alliance representing the same civilization having religion Christianity as a strong bond and relation. On the other hand, the one between Russia and France, represented no more than an alliance between the two countries on security issues such as attack by a third party and non-attack on each other. So, the first alliance offered a much deeper rapprochement than the second alliance, which means that such alliances based on ideology and civilization also express much larger imperialist tendencies than those based solely on security issues. Consequently, we can conclude that alliances for balance of powers are less imperialist when they do not have three concepts in common than alliances which have three conceptual similarities. This period is characterized by the theory of race that was developing and much more important than civilization, so Germany and Austria had more emotional ties than Russia with France.

The agreement between Russia and France, and on the other hand Germany and Austria, moved many important issues, where the rise of the German fleet and the problem with Morocco pushed Great Britain to agreements that did not necessarily put it in obligations with France. If Britain continued with the classical isolation that was a danger from Russia for Europe or German domination. Therefore, this period and these ideological developments first, and second from civilization, gradually began to put France and Great Britain in one camp.

The informal agreements that Germany had a chance to get with Britain and did not get, they got France did not insist on a formal agreement with Britain for military engagement and obligation (Cassels, 1996, p. 112). This was even called the *entente cordiale* (Cassels, 1996, p. 112). Although a more natural entente was with Protestant Germany than that of Catholic France but still the power of rapprochement through free and rapid movement and this movement to create and push public opinion.

Britain would also approach an agreement with Russia in 1907, which was greatly criticized in Britain. This agreement was made in 1905 where there was a revolution and the first elections were held in Russia (Cassels, 1996, p. 112) ... The antagonism was that Russia was an autocracy as opposed to the liberal Republican France and the constitutional liberal Monarchy of Great Britain. Ideologically there was a fundamental difference in this Entente which was not absolutely against Germany (Cassels, 1996, p. 112).

Here we have the creation of two alliances where one was represented by the tripartite alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and on the other the one between the cordial entente between Great Britain, France and Russia. Ideologically the autocracy dominated on the side of Berlin and Vienna and Italy was only one ally which much closely coincided with the cordial entente which would later change sides.

The tripartite alliance represented more the geopolitics of Teutonic rule and the Aryan race, which had a great deal of opposition to the Slavs than any civilization had opposition to Britain and France. But later, Berlin and Vienna were separated by ideology and realpolitik. Britain didn't want to allow dominant superpower in Europe, and Germany didn't realize that any breakdown of the tripartite alliance with Russia would be the end of the monarchy and the change of socialist and liberal forces growing in Europe.

7. The Balkan Wars and the transnational cooperation of the Slavs

The Eastern question had remained in the shadows but the first signs began to occur when the Young Turk revolution began in Turkey and as Britain engaged in the Boer war, Germany in the fleet issue and Russia in its war with Japan.

In the Balkans, Serbia was the cause of many problems. A state formally under the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, but independent with the help of Austria-Hungary - Serbia had the project and a vision for a pan-Slavism since 1844, designed by Ilia Garshanini, called 'Nachertanja', which on this occasion also became an opponent of Austria which had a Slavic minority in its provinces. Among other events, the Slavs had their own religion, almost a unique political and cultural civilization, and on these foundations, they found their nationalism.

The Treaty of 1878 signed in Berlin allowed Austro-Hungary to invade Bosnia (Hertslet, 1891, pp. 2759-2798) was an obstacle for Greater Serbia as it was for the Ottomans in the Balkans. To unite against the Turks or the Ottoman Empire and to persecute them from the Balkans while Russia was among the main initiators and guarantors of the agreement, first between Bulgaria and Serbia and then other countries with what was called the Balkan League (Hall, 2000, p. 21).

Thus, the first Balkan war was the unification of one Orthodox civilization against another civilization that was the Ottoman one as the representative of Islam. The premises of this Slavic and Greek union, in addition to having the framework of *raison d'état*, the union was also called on the orthodox religious approach, orthodox solidarity and against another civilization. This is where the union within civilization begins, because nationalism means ethnicity and nation, while Slavs and Orthodox were united beyond ethnicity and nation.

However, that raison d'état was a stronger ideology than civilization and the emergence of new powers resulted with the Second Balkan War. This was the war against Bulgaria by its former allies in the First Balkan War. According to the agreement, Bulgaria had a stake in Macedonia, but focusing on the whole war in Adrianople, Greece and Serbia had also occupied its part of Macedonia.Greece and Serbia refused to give the tribute in Macedonia to Bulgaria and latter then declared war on both countries. Turkey, then Romania, also entered in the war against Bulgaria for a piece of Bulgarian land, and thus Russia allowed Bulgaria to deliberately debacle in the Second Balkan War. This war also suited Russia, as the Bulgarians had expressed their tendencies for the expansion and conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) (Hall, 2000, pp. 107-129).

The Balkan wars in a row was an alert of the First World War, the formation of two alliances after 1890, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of state awareness, national and civilized consciousness, would quickly end any construction that was not based on the modern state, national and civilized concepts. This war was only a matter of time before it would threaten the Habsburg Empire as well. Future wars would disintegrate and destroy every creature that was raised on grounds that ignored the course of history which was being trumpeted with new theories, though this disintegration and this destruction would take almost a century.

This flow first from the Slavs had begun in 1903 when Serbian conspirators ousted the Obranovic family king and brought in Peter I of the Karadjordjevics (MacKenzie, 1995, pp. 23-24), who were much more nationalistic and close to Russia (MacKenzie , 1995, pp. 24-33). There was a goal for the subsequent dissolution of Austria-Hungary, as the latter annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even a nationalist society 'Narodna Odbrana' formed in Belgrade on October 8, 1908 began work to undermine the allegiance of Serbs living in the Habsburg Empire against the latter. By 1914, many assassinations were carried out by Serbs against Austro-Hungarian officials on missions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a revolutionary organization known as the 'New Bosnia'

which aimed at the dissolution of Austria-Hungary (Becherelli, 2015, p. 20). In May 1911 from the organizations 'NardonaOdbrana' and 'New Bosnia' came the organization 'Cerna Ruka' (Black Hand), which would also be the organizer of the assassination of the Habsburg heir, Franz Ferdinand (McMeekin, 2013, p. 21). This assassination of Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 and his wife Sofia took place in two interesting events, the first was Sofia's birthday, but the second coincided exactly with the same date of what the Serbs call Vidovdan or the Battle of Kosovo. This lost battle took place on June 28, 1389 is still celebrated today by the Serbs as the battle where Tsar Lazar fell in Blackbird Valley (Kosovo Valley) fighting against the Ottoman Empire.

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was the main reason for the cordial and tripartite alliance to take shape and for world history to take a direction that would change it profoundly. A war that was not only national but beyond nationalism, as nationalism reveals only the national feeling of a nation within a certain territory with a certain culture and a language, while the Slavs from Serbia, Russia, etc., were more than a nationalism, because it included more nations who each had their own characteristics but united in their Slavs-Orthodox civilization and the principle that you cannot be a Slav if you are not Orthodox.

When Serbia called on Russia for help from the attack coming from Austria-Hungary, it addressed it with the humility of Slavism: "We are not able to defend ourselves, so we ask Your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The very praiseworthy kindness that Your Majesty has often shown to us fills us with the strong conviction that even this time our call to the noble Slavic heart will not fall on deaf ears" (Stoessinger, 2007, p. 8).

On the other side of the events before the outbreak of World War I the Pan-German League was seen as endangered by the victory of the SDP and socialism at the expense of the elites as this could produce revolution or war (Pauley, 1979). Fukuyama explains how conservative institutions are when it comes to the need for reform (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 7). Therefore, the liberation of the forces that had taken place from 1890 onwards became more and more uncontrollable every day and the government was obliged to a certain extent to respond to the demands of the masses even when then the institutions did not want this.

Unification within European states such as Germany, Austria, France and Britain were not within the framework of civilization, it was the period when nationalism had made both the Socialists and the Liberals dependent. This is evidenced by the protests that have been held in these countries raising heavenly patriotism (Cassel, 1996, 127). However, this nationalism found space within countries where public opinion was mobilized and had democracies developed for the time, while in Russia nationalization was much weaker (Cassel, 1996, 128). This leads us to the fact that democracy and liberal institutions allowed the rise of any kind of ideology within it, but neither took its place after giving evidence of failure. Therefore, after national ideologies such as Nazism and fascism failed, the issue of civilization brought countries closer to democratic ideals by equating them with Western values, Christian values, etc.

However, first the Western civilization would be hit hard by the racial issue and the victories of the Germans. The victories of the Germans, especially in the south, greatly increased the racial sense of Teutonic superiority especially over the Slavs, as even against whom the Pan-German League was based (Cassel, 1996, 129).

This argues that the victories that a single state or a race could make, as in the case of Germany, which builds nationalism on the line of blood rather than civilization, tends to be much wilder and requires a racial monopoly, is more exceptive and they do not share the good with others, while later when there is a civilization aside, solidarity and interdependence is greater, thus enabling development and peace. Thus, nationalism as a racial and exceptive monopoly, for counter-balance and counter-value, opposes civilization or civilizations.

On the other side of the continent, in Asia, the Japan was the next country to be involved in the war, Japan had an alliance with Great Britain and using this alliance as a prominent pretext to enter the war, and on 23 August 1914 Tokyo began to invade German colonies and assets in China and the Pacific (Cassel, 1996, 129). The involvement of Japan into the war was not against the Germans in Europe, but against Germany in Asia as the Japanese extension has always had aims only in the vicinity of civilization close to Korea, China, Singapore, etc., as evidenced by World War II where Japan aimed for thriving Asia.

Civilization as a concept was not dominant in Europe; however, in order for civilization to win over the configurations of nationalism and any kind of ideology, this must be done by a superpower which dictates war and peace. On this occasion it was the USA which with its involvement into the First World War as a state belonging to Western civilization was able to directly influence and leave its mark and to completely change the course of history. So, the entry of the USA on the West side was crucial for the strong future of Western civilization, and given that the ideology and political system of the USA was built with democracy, then the establishment and development of democracy had to secure future in the West, where a civilization with an ideology would have a secure geopolitical future.

Definition of conflict from the former US President Woodrow Wilson as a war to end wars and save democracy reiterated entente propaganda. (Cassel, 1996, 133). Although he facilitated connection to individual freedom and national self-determination found no support in London and Paris, which had hitherto eliminated the complex question of self-determination, but, although necessity compelled states to abandon the slogans of peace, freedom and justice, the United States - or at least its president - was sincerely committed to their universal implementation. They were committed on changing the norms of international law with it (Cassel, 1996, 133).

Therefore, American cooperation with its European partners was limited; it was disappointing representation by the American representative in the Supreme War Council. The USA was not an allied power, bound by secret treaties; its ideological virginity was intact (Cassel, 1996, 133). Thus, the problems of the ideological approach brought essential problems in civilizing unification and it was only the necessity or *synthesis of security*[1] that determined the ideological, civilizing and geopolitical cooperation.

The Bolshevik Revolution in March 1917 and the USA involvement into the war changed forever the European and world order. Both of the events extended two ideologies which sealed the fate of a divided Europe throughout the twentieth century. The difference between these two issues that entered the international arena, the USA breaking its isolationism as an ideology and Russia temporarily turning into isolationism from continuous imperialism would lay the groundwork for deeper divisions beyond materialism and capitalism.

The end of the First World War would also be the beginning of a new order in international relations with new norms which were produced as a need for the unprecedented circumstances; in that direction Woodrow Wilson himself began this with the doctrine of the self-determination of nations.

8. Conclusion

The decline of conservatism and cabinet policy along with the collapse of Bismarck and the Reinsurance Agreement created the ground for political approaches to change. From 1890 onwards we find the emergence of theories and public opinion radically changing the politics of Europe and all the western states.

[1]Prof. Dr. Shinasi Rama from New York University gives a brilliant explanation for the construction of the *security synthesis* in his book "Nation Failure, Ethnic Elites, and Balance of Power".

The arrival of new elites in power and the pressure on the structural approach of Empires and states created the space for nationalism in particular, and for civilization in general, but also the emergence of various projects of ideological groups and this new structural approach created the circumstances where a scientific approach to security and geopolitics. The CIG comes with essential conclusions that remain inevitable, one of that is that the social sciences can't be explained on vacuum or with limitations, but only on complementary, chronological, historical and axiological knowledge.

It is also evident that in periods when the concept of nationalism reached its peak of its power, the ground was really being laid for another concept which will be more universal such as civilization. So, while nationalism created and strengthened nations, civilization built the need for the cooperation of these nations.

However, why we have argued that the first modern union within civilization is found in the Slavs and not in the Westerners is explained by the fact of national constructions. Westerners nationally and state-wise were far more powerful, stable, and conservative in maintaining that kind of construction. Also, more capable of fighting wars alone, while on the opposite side (Slavic) it was not. The West, however, recognizes unity within civilization when it comes to keeping the expansion of the Ottoman Empire away from the west.

References

[1]. Adams, R. M. C. (2007). *The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia and Prehispanic Mexico*. New Jersey, USA: Aldine Transaction.

[2]. Albig, W. (1956). *Modern public opinion*. Mcgraw Hill Book Company.

[3]. Aron, R. (1967). What Is a Theory of International Relations? *Journal of International Affairs, 21*(2), 185-206. Retrieved April 6, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/24370059

[4]. Becherelli, A. (2015). A. Biagini& G. Motta (Eds.), *The First World War: Analysis and Interpretation* (Vol. 1). London, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

[5]. Brzezinski, Z. (1993). *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century.* Tirana, Albania: Elena Gjika.

[6]. Cassels, A. (1996). *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*. New York, USA: Routledge.

[7]. Cohen, S. B. (2014). *Geopolitics: The geographyofinternationalrelations*. Rowman&Littlefield.

[8]. Dunn, D. (1973). Stalinism and the Catholic Church during the Era of World War II. *The Catholic Historical Review, 59*(3), 404-428. March 16, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/25019367

[9]. Easton, D. (1957). An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. *World Politics, 9*(3), 383-400. doi:10.2307/2008920

[10]. Easton, D. (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Michigan, USA: The University of Michigan.

[11]. Fukuyama, F. (2008). *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.* Tirana, Albania: AIIS.

[12]. Fukuyama, F. (2011). The originsofpoliticalorder: Fromprehumantimes to the FrenchRevolution. Farrar, StrausandGiroux.

[13]. Furet, F. (2003). *The past of an illusion, essay on the communist idea in the twentieth century* (p. 26). Peja, Kosovo: Dukagjini.

[14]. Gryzanovski, E. (1871). On the Origin and Growth of Public Opinion in Prussia. *The North American Review, 112*(231), 291-327. Mars 14, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/25109603

[15]. Hall, R. C. (2000). *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913*. London, UK: Routladge.

[16]. Hertslet, E. (1891). Treaty between Great-Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, Signed at Berlin, 13th July 1878. *The Map of Europe by Treaty; which have taken place since the general peace of 1814. With numerous maps and notes* (Vol. IV). London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

[17]. Howard, M. (1989). Ideology and International Relations. *Review of International Studies, 15*(1), 1-10. Mars 14, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/20097162

[18]. Langer, W. (1925). The Franco-Russian Alliance (1890-1894). *The Slavonic Review, 3*(9), 554-575. March 16, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/4201889

[19]. *Les PourparlesDiplomatiques* 16/26 julyqershor- 3/ 16 august (Paris: 1914) p.37. Cite from Stoessinger, J. G. (2007). *Why Nations Go to War*. Tirana, Albania: ISN.

[20]. MacKenzie, D. (1995). *Black Hand on Trial: Salonika, 1917*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press.

[21]. Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. *The Geographical Journal, 23*(4), 421-437. doi:10.2307/1775498

[22]. Mackinder, H. J. (1919). *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. London, UK: The London School of Economics and Political Science.

[23]. McLean, R. (2001). Kaiser Wilhelm II and the British Royal Family: Anglo-German Dynastic Relations in Political Context, 1890–1914. *History, 86*(284), 478-502. March 16, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/24425539

[24]. McMeekin, S. (2013). *July 1914: Countdown to War*. New York, USA: Basic Books.

[25]. Mommsen, W. (1990). Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Politics. *Journal of Contemporary History, 25*(2/3), 289-316. March 16, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/260734

[26]. Pauley, B. F. (1979). From Splinter Party to Mass Movement: The Austrian Nazi Breakthrough. *German Studies Review*, *2*(1), 7-29.

[27]. Popper, K. (1992). *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London, UK: Routledge.

[28]. Quigley, C. (1979). *The Evolution of Civilizations* (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, USA: Liberty Press.

[29]. Rama, S. A. (2019). *Nation Failure, Ethnic Elites, and Balance of Power: The International Administration of Kosova*. Springer.

[30]. Reese, R. (2014). The Russian Orthodox Church and 'Patriotic' Support for the Stalinist Regime during the Great Patriotic War. *War & Society*, *33*(2), 131-153.

[31]. Regaldo, M. (2008). *The new history of political ideas*. Pristina, Kosovo: Dukagjini.

[32]. Renner, G. T. (1942). *Human Geography in the Air Age (a Text for High School Students)*. Macmillan.

[33]. Reus-Smit, C. (2005). Constructivism. S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smit, & J. True (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (3rd ed). New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

[34]. Rich, N. (2006). *Diplomacy of the Great Powers 1814-1914*. Tirana, Albania: IDK

[35]. Roucek, J. (1944). A History of the Concept of Ideology. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 5*(4), 479-488. doi:10.2307/2707082

[36]. Spengler, O. (1926). *The Decline of the West* (5th ed.). New York, USA: Alfred A. Knopf, INC.

[37]. Spykman, N. J., & Nicholl, H. R. (1944). Geography of the Peace.

[38]. Sullivan, E. (1973). *Political Theory, 1*(1), 109-111. 14, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/191085

[39]. Toynbee, A. J. (1934). *A Study of History* (Vol. I). London, UK: Oxford University Press.